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Abstract
A well-known problem in current intrusion detection tools is that they create too many
low-level alerts and system administrators find it hard to cope up with the huge volume.
Also, when they have to combine multiple sources of information to confirm an attack, there
is a dramatic increase in the complexity. Attackers use sophisticated techniques to evade
the detection and current system monitoring tools can only observe the symptoms or effects
of malicious activities. When mingled with similar effects from normal or non-malicious
behavior they lead intrusion analysis to conclusions of varying confidence and high false
positive/negative rates.
In this thesis work we present an empirical approach to the problem of modeling un-
certainty where inferred security implications of low-level observations are captured in a
simple logical language augmented with uncertainty tags. We have designed an automated
reasoning process that enables us to combine multiple sources of system monitoring data
and extract highly-confident attack traces from the numerous possible interpretations of
low-level observations. We have developed our model empirically: the starting point was a
true intrusion that happened on a campus network we studied to capture the essence of the
human reasoning process that led to conclusions about the attack. We then used a Datalog-
like language to encode the model and a Prolog system to carry out the reasoning process.
Our model and reasoning system reached the same conclusions as the human administrator
on the question of which machines were certainly compromised. We then automatically
generated the reasoning model needed for handling Snort alerts from the natural-language
descriptions in the Snort rule repository, and developed a Snort add-on to analyze Snort
alerts. Keeping the reasoning model unchanged, we applied our reasoning system to two
third-party data sets and one production network. Our results showed that the reasoning
model is effective on these data sets as well. We believe such an empirical approach has the
potential of codifying the seemingly ad-hoc human reasoning of uncertain events, and can
yield useful tools for automated intrusion analysis.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents iv
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgments viii
Dedication ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 A true-life incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Background and related work 11
2.1 Intrusion detection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1 Types of IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2 IDS detection types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3 Problems in IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Reasoning under uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Alert reduction techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Attack graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.4 Other closely related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 Reasoning model 19
3.1 Modeling uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Observation correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Internal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Reasoning methodology 25
4.1 Reasoning framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Application of inference rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Proof strengthening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 Pre-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
iv
4.6 Handling time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 Automating model building for Snort 33
5.1 Snort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.1 Snort architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1.2 Snort signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1.3 Snort alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2 Knowledge base creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.1 Classtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.2 Snort rule document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 Snort alert translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6 Experiments 43
6.1 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2 Data sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2.1 Treasure Hunt data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2.2 Experiment on data collected on a honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2.3 Experiments on a production system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.4 Observations from the data sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7 Conclusion 49
7.1 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Bibliography 57
A Snort – Intrusion detection system 58
A.1 Snort default classtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.2 An example Snort rule document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.3 Snort database schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
v
List of Figures
1.1 Case Study: A true life incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 Observation correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Internal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Result of applying the reasoning system on the case study . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3 Preprocessing: Summarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1 SnIPS system architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 An example Snort rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3 An example Snort alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4 Example translated Snort alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1 Treasure hunt network topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2 Partial output trace from the reasoning system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.3 Data distribution in the three data sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
List of Tables
3.1 Uncertainty modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1 Automatically created obsMap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1 Reduction of alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vii
Acknowledgments
I express my deepest appreciation to advisor, Dr. Xinming Ou, for his support. Under
his guidance, I have learned many things in the last two years. It has been a pleasure and
an honor working with him.
I am grateful to Dr. S. Raj Rajagopalan for his continuous support from the beginning
of this work. His suggestions were instrumental to improving the quality of my work over
the years.
My special thanks to supervisory committee members, Dr. Doina Caragea and Dr.
David Schmidt for their comments and valuable feedback that helped in refining the quality
of this work.
I would like to thank my friends, Vijaya Iyer and Aditi Shukla for their assistance in
refining the earlier draft versions of this thesis.
This work was partially supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant
No. 0716665. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Science Foundation.
viii
Dedication
To Amma, Appa and Meera, who are always there for me.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Universities, business and government organizations depend on computer networks for most
of their day-to-day activities. Increasingly personal information such as credit card num-
bers, social security numbers, and other sensitive information are stored on computers. This
has resulted in a rise in attempts made to compromise a computer and to gain access to
unauthorized information. An attacker gains access to remote network resources using vul-
nerabilities found in software and protocols or through social engineering. Proper software
maintenance (operating system patches, software updates, etc.) and restricted network ac-
cess using firewalls is no longer a reliable solution to prevent attackers from infiltrating the
network. Also, recent studies show zero-day vulnerabilities are exploited more aggressively
than in the past. In order to identify intrusion of computing resources and have a situa-
tional awareness of the network, system administrators today perform intrusion analysis, a
combination of intrusion detection and computer forensics. This activity is an inexact sci-
ence; system administrators use a combination of intuition, experience, and low-level tools
to create and support positive or negative judgment about a security event.
However, with increase in the number of computing resources in a network, the volume
of the low-level system events collected is too high. This strains the intuitive capacity of the
human analyst. Many intricate attacks common today, make use of multiple vulnerabilities
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in a system. To identify such attacks, system administrators have to look into several places
(network packets, system logs, host configuration, etc.) and confirm an attack. For example,
in most enterprise networks, the web server accessible from the Internet happens to be the
first target. This sets a stage for the attacker to penetrate deeper into the network. What
follows might be a series of host compromise to achieve the attacker’s goal, such as steeling
credit card information from a SQL server. With diverse sources to look for intrusion
evidence, the complexity involved increases dramatically for a system administrator.
Another important problem with the output from low-level tools is that they give a
varying degree of uncertainty about a security event. Some observations 1 give only low
confidence about attacks, and few give a high degree of confidence. The degree of uncertainty
associated with the observations root from many factors. Some of the reasons include the
nature of the attack, effectiveness of the tool, frequency of the attack or how similar the
attack is to a normal activity. An increased network activity during office hours gives low
confidence about an ongoing attack compared to a high network activity around midnight.
Again, both these events could be benign or malignant depending on what caused the
network activity. It either can be an attacker downloading a list of credit card information
or an authorized event like software updates2. Thus, it is hard to rely on a single piece of
evidence to conclude an attack or machine compromise.
While the low-level observations (network packets, server logs, etc.) all have potential
implication for attack possibilities, few, if any of them directly provide a zero/one judgment
at the high-level abstraction (e.g. a machine has been compromised). Nevertheless, in
many remote intrusions a relatively small number of critical observations taken together
are sufficient to show that an attack has certainly happened as well as how it progressed.
The bottleneck emerges from consuming disparate sources of information to infer about a
complex attack.
1Alert and observation are used interchangeably in this text, they both mean the report issued by a tool
on observing a suspicious activity
2Software updates are usually scheduled during off peak hours.
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System administrators are highly time-constrained – an automatic tool that can sift
through the ocean of uncertain data to quickly and accurately locate the problem areas or
reduce the search space will be invaluable in practice. There are several technical challenges
such as combining multiple sources of information and handling uncertainty. The most diffi-
cult of the two is quantifying the degree of certainty in various assertions regarding possible
attack activities, and tracking how the uncertainty changes through correlation. Through
our interaction with highly capable system administrators who face the challenge of un-
certainty every day while protecting enterprise systems, we observed that human analysts
do well without relying on any numerical measures. We illustrate a true-life story in sec-
tion 1.1.1. This example clearly shows progress made by the human analyst for identifying
the intrusion and the various levels of uncertainty associated with each incident.
1.1.1 A true-life incident
Consider the following sequence of events (see figure 1.1) that actually occurred at a uni-
versity campus. The system administrator noticed an abnormally large spike in campus-
network traffic (Observation 1 ). He took the netflow dump for that time period, searched
it for known malicious IP addresses, and identified that four Trend Micro (anti-malware)
servers had initiated IRC connections to some known BotNet controllers (Observation 2 ).
The system administrator suspected that the four Trend Micro servers had been compro-
mised. At the console of one of the servers he dumped the memory, from which he found
what appeared to be malicious code modules (Observation 3 ). He also looked at the open
TCP socket connections and noticed that the server had been connecting to some other
Trend Micro servers on campus through the IRC channel (Observation 4 ). He concluded
that all those servers were compromised with a zero-day vulnerability in the Trend Micro
server software. He did the same for the other identified servers and found even more com-
promised servers. Altogether, the system administrator identified 12 compromised machines
and took them oﬄine. When the administrator first noticed the spike in network traffic,
3
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with other 
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Is my machine 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Figure 1.1: Case Study: A true life incident
the questions facing him were: is the network experiencing an attack and if so, which ma-
chines were compromised. However, none of the low-level observations alone could give him
a definitive answer to these high-level questions. Observation 1 (traffic spike) could indi-
cate a variety of causes, many of which are benign3. Observation 2 (connections to BotNet
controllers) has a higher chance of being an indication of malicious activity and hence a
higher degree of likelihood that the identified hosts are compromised. However, an IRC
connection being made to a “known” BotNet controller does not necessarily mean that the
machine has been taken over (compromised). The list of “known” BotNet controllers may
contain false positives or it could be because somebody was probing BotNet controllers for
3To take an example, the “Microsoft Patch Tuesday” often significantly increases network traffic in an
enterprise network.
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research purposes. (The interviewed system administrator suggested this false positive as
he did this himself on a periodic basis.) Observation 3 (suspicious code in memory) is also
a strong indication that the machine may have been controlled by an attacker. But it is not
always easy to determine whether a suspicious module found in the memory dump is indeed
malicious, especially with zero-day vulnerabilities. So this alert also has some false positive.
Observation 4, like observation 2, cannot definitely prove that the machines observed are
under the control of attackers because IRC channels are occasionally (rarely) used as a com-
munication channel between servers. However, when we put all the four pieces of evidence
together, it seems clear that an attack has certainly happened and succeeded and we can
say that which machines have been almost certainly compromised.
In handling this incident, the system administrator had to admit that the observations
could have multiple interpretations, but he could conclude that one interpretation is most
likely to be the case by linking the semantics of multiple observations. For example, al-
though neither observation 3 nor 4 alone can give us high enough confidence to say that the
host is definitely compromised, by linking their semantics we can dramatically strengthen
our confidence in the assertion, since both 3 and 4 point to the same interpretation. We
observed the same pattern in many other incidents we learned from interviewing system
administrators. It appears that even without quantitative measures on uncertainty, the se-
mantic links among possible evidence can dramatically increase one’s confidence on whether
an attack has actually happened and its consequences. As a result, humans can handle the
uncertainty pretty well by “connecting the dots” among various pieces of evidence. However,
manual analysis alone is not scalable and sustainable in the face of large-scale automated
attacks we face today. In this incident, the human system administrator had all the common
security tools at his disposal but none of the tools could provide the crucial capability of
analysis and the manual analysis took a long time.
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1.2 Empirical approach
As a first step, we intend to design tools that help reduce the amount of time that the system
administrator has to spend in the process to identify an intrusion. For this, we propose an
empirical approach to automate reasoning with uncertainty in intrusion analysis. We design
a reasoning model where human knowledge used to draw conclusions about uncertain events
can be codified and applied mechanically to future incidents. Although reasoning about in-
trusions on different incidents can vary significantly, the basic principles are quite consistent.
We design a reasoning model that captures the essence of the generic reasoning rationale,
not specific features of any particular incident. The model provides a language whereby hu-
man experts can share knowledge useful for intrusion analysis in a machine-readable format,
and an automated reasoning engine can make use of the knowledge, significantly expanding
a human’s capability. Both the model and the reasoning engine are designed empirically
through studying real security incidents.
This is certainly not the first attempt at automating reasoning about intrusions. Past
work has applied rule-based systems to correlate audit logs and find out attacks [1, 2]. There
is also a large amount of work on IDS alert correlation [3–8]. These previous approaches do
not address the uncertainty problem explicitly, i.e., the reasoning systems do not model when
and how confidence levels on assertions can be strengthened in the correlation process4. An
explicit model for uncertainty in reasoning is crucial to making alert correlation tools useful
in practice. Zhai, et al. [9] has pioneer work in this area by combining alert-correlation and
Bayesian-Network techniques to reason about complementary intrusion evidence from both
IDS alerts and system monitoring logs so that high-confidence traces can be distinguished
from ones that are less certain. Recent years have also seen the application of quantitative
mathematical methods such as Bayesian Network [10, 11] and Dempster Shafer theory [12,
4The DIDS (Distributed Intrusion Detection System) project [2] uses a Rule Value (RV) to represent the
confidence that a rule is useful in detecting intrusions. The RV is trained and adjusted through feedback to
the expert system. While the RV could be thought of as a measure of uncertainty, its use does not lead to
the reduction of uncertainty through connecting the dots in observations. Thus it is more a heuristic-based
optimization than an explicit model of how uncertainty changes in reasoning.
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13] in intrusion detection [14–16]. We have chosen not to start from those mathematical
theories, because to utilize them we need a priori the logical structures among the various
observations and hypotheses. In Bayesian Network, the logical structure is the graphical
model that encodes the causality relation among assertions; in Dempster-Shafer theory,
the logical structure is the “compatibility relation” among assertions. Such mathematical
theories work well when a “good structure” is given and their power lies in the capability
of combining numerical measures (probability or belief functions) over the structure in a
systematic way. For intrusion analysis, identifying the structure of attacks is the biggest
challenge itself, which is intermingled with the challenge caused by uncertainty. Thus, it
is not obvious how the aforementioned mathematical theories can be directly applied to
yield practical tools. Instead of starting from these mathematical theories, we start from
true-life experiences like the one described above, and design a model that systematically
“simulates” what a human can do manually, formulating such empirical experiences such
that the model can be applied mechanically to future incidents. We believe this empirical,
bottom-up approach is an important first step in understanding the nature of reasoning
about uncertainty in cyber security, and gaining experience that may make some quantitative
approaches viable in the future.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, I present a method and tool for automated intrusion analysis for combining
alerts tagged with uncertainty and from disparate sources. The following are the original
contributions through this work.
Some materials presented in this thesis were published in the 25th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) in 2009 [17].
An empirical model for uncertainty We present a model for capturing the meanings
of low-level system observation data in terms of high-level conditions of interest to intru-
7
sion analysis. We adopt an empirical approach where the model and inference process are
based on how human administrators reason about attacks in real security incidents. We
use qualitative rather than quantitative assessment to capture the uncertainty inherent in
such assertions. The qualitative assessment reflects the imprecise nature of the certainty
levels’ semantics and it also makes it easier to understand by humans, enabling discus-
sion/refinement of the reasoning model in an open forum. Such a model can be linked
to existing knowledge bases such as the Snort 5 rule repository. Our model is capable of
expressing logical connections among the high-level conditions (also with qualitative uncer-
tainty assessment) so that it can reason about multi-host, multi-stage intrusions with traces
spread across various types of system monitoring data.
Reasoning methodology We present a reasoning process that can utilize such a model
and existing IDS tools to automatically identify high-confidence attack traces from large
diverse sets of system monitoring data not restricted just to IDS alerts. We also present
within this model a method for strengthening the confidence in an assertion by combining
multiple independent pieces of evidence of low or moderate confidence. Our model of high-
level conditions consists of generic predicates such as “compromised,” “exploit sent,” etc.
that are independent of the scenario at hand. What can change from one scenario to another
are the instantiation of the predicates and the certainty tags associated with them as the
scenario events are processed and the paths that the reasoning process takes through these
conditions. We believe that human administrators similarly have a small set of “target”
conditions in mind when they process intrusion data and there is value in capturing those
target conditions directly in an automated reasoning process. We implemented a prototype
of a reasoning engine using the true-life case study as a guide and showed that the tools
reasoning tracked the system administrator’s reasoning process and achieved the same set
of high-level conclusions with high confidence.
5Snort is an open source network intrusion detection system. http://www.snort.org
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A Snort add-on based on our model and method We automatically generated the
significant part of our reasoning model from the classtype, impact, and ease of exploit
fields associated with Snort rule descriptions and show that the knowledge base needed
by our reasoning engine can be readily created if security monitoring tools use our model
language, instead of natural language, to describe the potential meanings of various types
of security alerts. Based on this automatically-derived knowledge base and the prototype
implementation of our reasoning engine, we provide a Snort add-on, called SnIPS 6, that
analyzes millions of Snort alerts reported from an enterprise network and only report those
with high-confidence evidence associated with them.
Evaluation of the methodology We applied the SnIPS tool to two third-party datasets,
and computer science department network at Kansas State University. The core reasoning
engine and model was kept unchanged in the evaluation. We found remarkably that our tool
discovered interesting scenarios from the three data sets, even though our core reasoning
model was developed from a very simple and completely different incident. The application
of SnIPS also results in dramatic reduction in the amount of data a system administrator
needs to analyze. The false positives from the analysis helped us identify imprecision from
the automatically generated Snort knowledge base and some subtle but minor gaps in the
core model as well. This indicates that such an empirical approach could produce a shared
knowledge base that can be constantly refined among security practitioners to yield agile
and accurate tools.
Rest of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides the background information
on intrusion detection system and discusses related work in the areas of intrusion detec-
tion system and reasoning with uncertainty. In chapter 3, we discuss the reasoning model
developed based on the true life incident. Chapter 4 deals with our reasoning framework
and proof strengthening technique. We discuss the automated model building for Snort in
chapter 5 and in chapter 6 we show the experiments done to evaluate the empirical model
6http://cis.ksu.edu/~xou/argus/software/snips
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developed. In chapter 7 we conclude with a summarization of our work along with future
direction of research.
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Chapter 2
Background and related work
2.1 Intrusion detection system
Intrusion can be defined as “an unwanted and unauthorized intentional access of computer
and network resources” [18]. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), are systems used to identify
such intrusive activity in computers and network services. One can compare IDS to a car
alarm or a burglar alarm installed to detect theft or unwanted access to the property.
2.1.1 Types of IDS
IDS has been around for a couple of decades now. IDS can be software-based or a combina-
tion of software and hardware in a stand-alone system. Current IDSes are specialized and
developed based on the services it is monitoring. They can be roughly classified into the
following categories:
Network-based
A network-based IDS, or NIDS, monitors a network segment for intrusive activity. Typically
they are installed in a network tap or span port, a location in the network where it can
monitor the entire network traffic. Also, the network interface card (NIC) should support
promiscuous mode1. NIDS performs protocol analysis or inspects the payload of the network
traffic to identify malicious behavior.
1Promiscuous mode allows NIC to view the traffic not sent to its MAC address
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Host-based
A host-based IDS, or HIDS, monitors only the host it resides in. Most HIDS identifies
malicious behavior by analyzing system call, system log, file system modification, etc.
Application-based
An application-based IDS (AIDS) protects only the application it monitors. Since AIDS are
tailored to a particular application, e.g. Apache web server, they usually are more accurate
than the generic IDSs previously discussed. They are similar to HIDS or NIDS, but with
more specific rules or signatures for the application.
2.1.2 IDS detection types
In order to identify an intrusion, IDS system has to understand an intrusion and differentiate
it from a benign activity. To do this it can be either provided with the information about
the intrusion and asked to report such events, or provide with benign events and report all
events that are not benign. The detection type can be broadly categorized as signature-based
detection and anomaly-based detection.
Signature-detection
Exploits, viruses, trojans and other malicious programs exhibit a pattern in their behavior
or payload. For example, buffer over flow exploit might contain NO OP code 2. In signature
detection, we search for these patterns of known attacks. IDS uses these patterns (also
known as rules or signatures) and compare them against the network traffic or log files.
When a pattern is matched it is reported as an alert. Signature based IDS may fail to detect
novel attacks as the pattern of such attacks may be unknown. Even with this drawback
signature-based IDSes are popular compared to anomaly-based IDS discussed in the next
subsection.
2NOOP (short for No Operation) is an assembly language instruction, sequence of programming language
statements, or computer protocol command that effectively does nothing at all (Wikipedia).
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Anomaly-detection
In anomaly detection, a model is developed by training it with information about benign
activity. Once trained the model will be able to identify benign activities and anything that
is unidentifiable is flagged as potentially malicious.
Even though using anomaly detection can identify novel attacks, this approach has a
very high false positive rate making it less popular than signature-based IDS. Also, training
an IDS for normal behavior is very difficult in practice.
IDS response type
On seeing an intrusion, IDS can be instructed to perform a predefined set of actions. A
passive response system will issue an alert and/or log entries in response to the alert. An
active response system may take actions such as drop the packet, send reset packet to the
connection, add IP address to the block list, and so on.
2.1.3 Problems in IDS
False positives IDS alerts that are triggered on benign activity where no intrusion or
attack is underway are called false positives. A false positive can be issued because the
benign activity matched an attack signature.
False negatives When an IDS fails to detect an actual intrusion since it didn’t have the
rules to match the attack, it is called a false negative.
An ideal IDS should have very low false positive and false negative rate. But in reality,
this is hardly achievable because there exists a correlation between false positive and false
negatives in an IDS. Since undetected attacks are more detrimental than a false alarm,
current IDSes try to have a low false negative rate at the cost of having false positives. In
order to have low false negatives, the signatures or anomaly-model are generic in nature,
which results in reporting more benign activities as attacks.
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Because of the above mentioned trade off, current IDS suffers from high false positive
rates. In an enterprise network comprised of many hosts, IDS sensors create thousands of
alerts each day. With limited human resources, it is very difficult to analyze the low-level
alerts and identify an actual attack. Moreover, an IDS issues an alert on the attempts
made by an attacker to compromise a network element. This might result in generating a
huge amount of alerts if the attacker is naive and trying many different attacks. While it is
important to capture such attempts, security officers and system administrators are more
interested in identifying potentially successful attacks as there may be an overwhelming
number of failed attempts.
2.2 Related work
2.2.1 Reasoning under uncertainty
Uncertainty in data, even specifically in the context of security analysis, is a vast and fertile
topic. Probabilistic reasoning appears to be a natural candidate for such problems and
there have been several attempts along this direction [9, 14, 16]. A fundamental challenge
in applying these techniques is how to obtain the logical structure needed for combining the
probability measures. Moreover, these techniques require as inputs statistical parameters
in terms of probability distributions of related events, conditional probability tables, etc.
that have proven very hard to estimate or learn from real-life data because of overwhelming
background noise. For security analysis, it is nearly impossible to obtain the ground truth
in real traces and public data sets and it is hard if not impossible to realistically simulate
attack scenarios. Consequently calibrating analysis techniques with metrics such as false
positive/negative ratios is a huge challenge (See [8] for details) and intrusion analysis remains
a manual and intuitive art, which has inspired us to formulate a logic that approximates
human reasoning that works with a qualitative assessment on a few confidence levels which
are relatively easy to understand. We acknowledge that this formulation not only hides the
lack of knowledge of base probabilities but also reflects the great deal of ambiguity that
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exists in intrusion analysis of real data. We hope that by creating an option to specify
the confidence level explicitly and by providing general practical tools to manipulate these
uncertain pieces of knowledge, we can bypass some of these fundamental problems and gain
experience and insight that may make some statistical approaches viable in the future.
Friedman and Halpern used a new approach to modeling uncertainty based on “plausi-
bility measures” [19]. Our levels of uncertainty are inspired by similar considerations but
we do not use their precise definition because the meaning of negation is not yet clear in our
context. Similarly, a formal description of our logic as a modal logic is the subject of future
investigation. Along similar lines, the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory [12, 20] has been used
effectively in many kinds of evidential analysis. This theory allows us to construct belief
functions and plausibility measures for beliefs by combining sets of events within certain
constraints. There have been highly customized applications of the DS theory to application
domains in AI and expert systems, where numerical quantification is not possible (see, for
example, [21, 22]). These logics may be useful in building a theoretical underpinning for our
system; we have only done a partial investigation in this direction as our focus has been on
building usable empirical tools.
2.2.2 Alert reduction techniques
The literature on IDS alert reduction techniques is vast and they can be roughly categorized
into alert correlation [1, 3–9, 23–27], alert clustering [28, 29] and alert verification [30–34].
The goal of these works are to eliminate redundancy, remove failed attempts and provide a
logical correlation of the alerts so that a system administrator can easily comprehend the
huge volume of alerts.
Alert correlation
Most of IDS alert correlation works model IDS-specific states using pre- and post-conditions
that drive a correlation model and rely on the existence of a sparse (nearly deterministic)
mapping from alerts to their pre-/post-conditions. It appears to be difficult to model in this
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manner ubiquitous alerts such as “abnormally high network traffic” that could be indicative
of any of a wide variety of possible conditions. Our observation correspondence model
explained in chapter 3.2 assigns a direct meaning to an observation and our internal model
allows such meanings to be flexibly linked together based on their semantics. Such flexibility
is important when the evidence is tenuous and subject to multiple interpretations.
Alert clustering
In alert clustering, a set of similar alerts are clustered and represented as a single alert.
For example, alerts having similar source and destination IP addresses, alert types but
different time stamps are clustered and represented as a single alert. The time stamp of the
new predicate will be a time range having the earliest and latest time stamp from the set
of similar alerts. This step helps in reducing the redundancy in alerts generated by IDS.
Julish [28] proposed a data mining based alert clustering technique to discover root causes.
According to this work, a few dozen of root causes generally account for more than 90%
of the alerts. By identifying the root causes it is possible to filter alerts caused by benign
root cause and thus reduce the future alert load. Clustering is a good technique to reduce
the redundant information in the alerts. A limitation of alert clustering is that they do not
provide a high-level situational awareness of the network and causal relation between the
clustered events.
To handle the possibly enormous inputs but at the same time keep the linkage between
low-level traces to high-level meanings, our pre-processing step includes data reduction based
on clustering and simple correlation of local observations. Much of the previous work in IDS
has addressed this important problem [5, 8] (including the “layered approach” of Martignoni
et al. [35]). We intend to use all applicable tools and approaches from these works.
Other kinds of intrusion analysis such as M2D2 [23] require classifying incoming informa-
tion into various categories with mathematical notations which is a challenge for the typical
users; an important principle of our model is to represent knowledge as simple “assertions”
that can be easily translated into natural language.
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Alert verification
Kruegel et al. [34] introduced the idea of alert verification, a method for filtering failed
attempts from IDS alerts. Alert verification use active and passive techniques to verify if
conditions for success are favorable or observe the effect of an exploit to determine success.
For example, the system verifies if the services exist on the host the exploit is attempted
at and if the version of the services is vulnerable to this attack. Host can be probed to
gather such information in real time or gather information periodically (once a week or
when the system is updated) to avoid disrupting the services at every attempt. Observing
the effects of an attack can be useful too. If an attack is known to disrupt a service, probing
to find if the service is up can help identify if the attempt was a failure or successful one.
Atlantides [30] by Bolzoni et al., proposed an architecture design of alert verification for
network intrusion detection system.
2.2.3 Attack graph
Another related research area is attack graphs [36–41]. While primarily used in vulner-
ability assessment and security hardening, attack graphs can identify multi-stage attack
possibilities. Lingyu Wang et al. [41] used attack graphs for correlating, hypothesizing and
predicting alert correlation. They also proposed queue graph, an approach to retain the lat-
est alert of each type. The correlation between old and new alert of each type is implicitly
represented using the temporal order between alerts. This approach is efficient in handling
a large amount of alerts if they are of the same type. Recently, Zhang [42] proposed a new
representation of attack graphs which can better handle intrusion detection. However, we
have not seen systematic treatment of uncertainty in intrusion analysis using attack graph
techniques.
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2.2.4 Other closely related work
BotHunter [43] is an application for identifying Bot machines by correlating Snort alerts
with a number of other system-monitoring events. The notions of “confidence score” and
“evidence threshold” are introduced to capture the uncertainty in the correlation process
and specific processes are designed for the purpose of Bot detection. The goal of our work
is to provide a simple but more general model for intrusion analysis.
Hollebeek and Waltzman [44] proposed a notion of “suspicion” in modeling uncertainty
in intrusion analysis. It appears that the approach does not further differentiate the var-
ious meanings that could be associated with a “suspicious” event. The system relies on a
“deductive graph” and a “suspicion graph” to propagate certainty levels within the context
of the system under concern. But with just a single notion of “suspicion” for each event,
it is not clear how to build or interpret the meanings of such graphs in a systematic and
consistent manner.
Scyllarus [45] is another closely related work. Their goal is to perform IDS fusion using
Bayes nets and System-Z+ [46] with qualitative probability. This system use the notion
of “possible” and “likely” to determine if an event reported by IDS is a false positive.
The primary goal of our work is to provide a framework for specifying varying degree of
confidence level and use proof strengthening technique to elevate the confidence level.
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Chapter 3
Reasoning model
In this chapter we describe our reasoning model empirically developed from the true-life
incident. Observation correspondence relation maps low-level observations to high-level con-
ditions, internal model captures the relationships among high-level conditions; and modes
captures the degree of uncertainty. Our motivation behind the reasoning model was the
true-life incident (case study) discussed in section 1.1.1. We use this case study as an exam-
ple to understand the system administrator’s analytical state in the course of investigation,
identify the rationale behind his decision at various stages, and design a logic that is similar
to the human reasoning process.
3.1 Modeling uncertainty
While the goal of intrusion analysis is detection of events at a high-level of abstraction (e.g.,
a machine has been compromised and has been used to compromise others), tools today
operate with any known accuracy only at low levels of abstraction (e.g., network packets,
server logs, etc.). Uncertainty arises from this semantic gap. For example, a packet pattern
(a “signature”) could be associated mostly with attacks but on occasion with legitimate
use as well. Furthermore, it may not tell us whether the attack succeeded. A key step in
tackling the uncertainty challenge is to develop a model that can link multiple low-level
observations to the conditions under concern at the high level and simultaneously allow us
to specify our confidence in the assertions.
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Confidence level Mode
low possible p
medium likely l
high certain c
Table 3.1: Uncertainty modes
For example, an abnormal high network traffic (low-level observation) could mean
that an attacker is performing some network activity (high-level condition). Simi-
larly, the netflow dump showing a host communicating with known BotNet controllers
(low-level observation) indicates that it is likely an attacker has compromised the host
(high-level condition). All these assertions are associated with varying degrees of uncer-
tainty. For example, compared with the anomalous high network traffic, a netflow filter
that shows communication with known BotNet controllers is a more confident assertion on
attacker activity. It is crucial that the reasoning model be capable of expressing such differ-
ences and it is desirable that this be done without relying on probability parameters that
are difficult to obtain and hard to justify for humans.
The reasoning model uses three modes p, l, c, standing for “possible, likely, certain”
to express low, moderate, and high confidence levels (See table 3.1). Even though one
could think of certainty level as a continuous quantity ranging from completely unknown to
completely certain, in practice, human system administrators only deal with a few confidence
levels that roughly correspond to the ones defined here.These words are also used routinely
in natural-language description of security knowledge bases such as the Snort rule repository.
These uncertainty levels are assigned by humans and apart from the obvious ordering (p <
l < c) there is no ascribing of probability ranges to each level.
With this qualitative notion of uncertainty, two types of logical assertions are used
in the reasoning model: observation correspondence which maps low-level observations to
high-level conditions, and internal model which captures relationships among high-level
conditions (also called internal conditions). Correspondingly, obs(O) is used to denote a
fact about observation O, and int(F ) to denote an internal condition F . For example,
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A1 : obs(anomalyHighTraffic)
p7−→ int(attackerNetActivity)
A2 : obs(netflowBlackListFilter(H,BlackListedIP))
l7−→ int(attackerNetActivity)
A3 : obs(netflowBlackListFilter(H,BlackListedIP))
l7−→ int(compromised(H))
A4 : obs(memoryDumpMaliciousCode(H))
l7−→ int(compromised(H))
A5 : obs(memoryDumpIRCSocket(H1, H2))
l7−→ int(exchangeCtlMessage(H1, H2))
Figure 3.1: Observation correspondence
obs(netflowBlackListFilter(ip1, ip2)) is an observation from the netflow blacklist filter that
“machine ip1 is communicating with a known blacklisted (and hence likely malicious) host
ip2”, whereas int(compromised(ip1)) is an internal condition that “ip1 is compromised.”
3.2 Observation correspondence
Figure 3.1 shows the observation correspondence relation for the observations in the true-life
incident described in section 1.1.1 along with the corresponding uncertainty modes. In A1 an
abnormal high network traffic obs(anomalyHighTraffic) is mapped to int(attackerNetActivity),
meaning an attacker is performing some network activity. This is a low-confidence judgment
because a high network activity could be caused by many benign events such as a autho-
rized user downloading movies; thus the mode is p. Intuitively, the p mode means there are
other equally possible interpretations for the same observation. A2 and A3 give the meaning
to an alert identified in netflow analysis. There are a number of filtering tools that can
search for potential malicious patterns in a netflow dump such as “capture daemon” and
“flow-nfilter.” These rules deal with one filter that identifies communication with known
malicious IP addresses. Since any such activity is a strong indication of attacker activity
and compromise of the machine involved, the modality of the two rules is l. There are
still other possibilities, e.g. the communication could be issued by a legitimate user who
wants to find out something about the malicious IP address. But the likelihood of that is
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significantly lower than what is represented by the right-hand side of the two rules. It is
legitimate to have multiple observation correspondence assertions for the same observation:
they may represent different aspects or possibilities of an observation. A4 says if memory
dump on machine H identifies malicious code then H is likely to be compromised. A5 says if
the memory dump identifies open IRC sockets between machine H1 and H2 then it is likely
that the IRC channel was used to exchange control messages between BotNet members.
We recognize that these observation correspondence assertions are subjective. Quan-
tifying the results of intrusion sensing in a robust manner has remained a hard problem
for a variety of reasons [47]. Our goal is to create a flexible and lightweight framework
wherein a system administrator can feed in these beliefs of certainty and see what conse-
quences arise. For example, a system administrator may think the mode of A4 ought to be
c, which would be acceptable. One advantage of such a logic is that it facilitates discussion
and sharing of security knowledge. Given the large base of similar deployed infrastructures,
shared experiences from a large community can likely help tune the modes in those as-
sertions. We envision a rule repository model like that for Snort, where a community of
participants contribute and agree upon a set of rules in an open language. Currently there
are only coarse-grained classification and some natural-language explanations for the mean-
ings behind each Snort alert. In chapter 5, we show how a small number of internal-model
predicates can give meanings to the vast majority of Snort alerts and that the observation
correspondence relation can actually be automatically generated from a Snort rules class
type and the “impact” and “ease of attack” fields in the rules natural-language description.
If the Snort rule writers had a standard language for such information they would be able
to readily provide the observation correspondence assertions for Snort alerts.
3.3 Internal model
The reasoning model should also express the logical relations among the various high-level
conditions so that such knowledge can be mapped to correlate low-level events. For example,
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I1f : int(compromised(H1))
f, p−→ int(probeOtherMachine(H1, H2))
I1b : int(probeOtherMachine(H1, H2))
b, c−→ int(compromised(H1))
I2f : int(compromised(H1))
f, p−→ int(sendExploit(H1, H2))
I2b : int(sendExploit(H1, H2))
b, c−→ int(compromised(H1))
I3f : int(sendExploit(H1, H2))
f, l−→ int(compromised(H2))
I3b : int(compromised(H2))
b, p−→ int(sendExploit(H1, H2))
I4f : int(compromised(H1)), int(compromised(H2))
f, p−→ int(exchangeCtlMessage(H1, H2))
I4b1 : int(exchangeCtlMessage(H1, H2))
b, c−→ int(compromised(H1))
I4b2 : int(exchangeCtlMessage(H1, H2))
b, c−→ int(compromised(H2))
Figure 3.2: Internal model
the model should include knowledge such as “after an attacker has compromised a machine,
he/she may perform some network activity from the machine.” This is a generic action
common to many attack scenarios. This knowledge can reveal potential hidden correlations
between low-level observations, (e.g., high network traffic and netflow filtering result). In
the absence of any context to guide us, a traffic spike could be due to any of a number of
things but in the context of a likely compromise, the parameters of the traffic burst become
important — if the traffic emanated from the likely compromised machine it can be assigned
a different meaning than if it did not.
Figure 3.2 shows the internal model we developed from studying the real-life incident.
We use Cl
d,m−→ Cr to represent the inference rules for the internal conditions, namely condi-
tion Cl can infer condition Cr. There are two modality operators, d and m, associated
with a rule. Like in observation correspondence, the m mode specifies the confidence
in the inference and takes values from {p, l, c}. The d mode indicates the direction of
the inference and could be either f (forward) or b (backward). In forward inference, Cr
is caused by Cl, thus the arrow must be aligned with time, i.e. Cr shall happen after
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Cl. This can specify knowledge for reasoning what could happen after a known condi-
tion becomes true, e.g. after an attacker sends an exploit to a machine, he will
likely compromise the machine (I3f ). In the backward inference, we reason what could
have happened before to cause a known condition, and thus the direction of inference is
opposite to time. Example: if a malicious probe is sent from a machine, then an
attacker must have already compromised the machine (I1b). As another example, the
forward inference rule I1f specifies that “if an attacker has compromised machine H1, he
can perform a malicious probe from H1 to another machine H2.” This inference has a low
certainty: the attacker may or may not choose to probe another machine after compromis-
ing one. Thus the rule is qualified by the p mode. I4f is the only rule in this model that
has two facts on the left-hand side. As in typical logic-programming languages, the comma
represents the AND logical relation.
The internal model discussed above provides a flexible framework for representing high-
level abstract conditions and the relationship among various high-level conditions. Adding
a new security incident will require a new observation correspondence to map the incident
to any of the internal conditions developed from our case study. In chapter 5, we show our
automated approach to build observation correspondence for Snort IDS. Similarly, adding
new additional internal conditions will require minimal effort. The new internal conditions
along with the relationship with other predicates must be specified in the internal condition.
Adding new internal conditions or new observation correspondence relation will not require
any modification to the reasoning engine discussed in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Reasoning methodology
The reasoning model described in chapter 3 is analogous to human thinking – observations
are reflected as beliefs with varying strengths and the beliefs are related to one another
with varying strengths. This chapter will introduce the reasoning process to use such a
model to “simulate” human thinking such that an automated inference process can allow
us to combine observations to construct sophisticated attack conclusions along with a semi-
quantitative measure of our confidence. This inference process is capable of deriving from
a large number of possibilities high-confidence beliefs corroborated by a number of comple-
mentary evidence pieces logically linked together.
4.1 Reasoning framework
Figure 4.1 presents the architecture of our reasoning system. The two modules of the
reasoning model — observation correspondence (described in chapter 3.2) and internal model
(described in chapter 3.3) are input to the reasoning engine. Both modules are specified in
Datalog [48], a simple logic-programming language. The raw observations are pre-processed
and the distilled results are converted to Datalog tuples as input to the reasoning system.
The reasoning engine is itself implemented in Prolog. An important feature of our design is
that every component of the system is specified declaratively, which has the useful property
that once all specifications are loaded into the Prolog system, a simple Prolog query will
automatically and efficiently search for true answers based on the logic specification. For
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Figure 4.1: System architecture
example, a user can ask a question “which machines are certainly compromised?” in the
form of a simple Prolog query. Our reasoning engine will then give the answer along with
the evidence in the form of logical proofs.
4.2 Application of inference rules
All the rules in the observation correspondence and internal model can be viewed as infer-
ence rules. The reasoning engine applies those rules on the input Datalog tuples to derive
assertions with various levels of certainty. The certainty of the derived fact is the lowest
certainty of the facts and rules used to derive it.
We use int(F,m)⇐ Pf to represent that “the internal fact F is true with modality m”,
and Pf is the proof that shows the logical derivation steps arriving at the conclusion. From
an observation one can derive an internal belief with some degree of certainty, based on
the observation correspondence relation. As an example, the open IRC Socket identified
through memory dump in the incident (Observation 4) described in section 1.1.1 will be an
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input to our system: obs(memoryDumpIRCSocket(172.16.9.20,172.16.9.1)). Together with
observation correspondence A5 shown in figure 3.1 the rule will derive:
int(exchangeCtlMessage(’172.16.9.20’,’172.16.9.1’), l)⇐
obs(memoryDumpIRCSocket(’172.16.9.20’,’172.16.9.1’))
There can be more than one derivation if there are multiple observation correspondences.
This is the first step that happens internally in the reasoning engine. All the observations
are mapped into an internal condition.
Using the internal-model rules shown in figure 3.2, further internal conditions are derived.
The fact int(exchangeCtlMessage(172.16.9.20,172.16.9.1), l) derived above, together with
the internal-model rule I4b1 , would yield the following derivation trace.
int(compromised(172.16.9.20), l)⇐
int(exchangeCtlMessage(172.16.9.20,172.16.9.1), l)⇐
obs(memoryDumpIRCSocket(172.16.9.20, 172.16.9.1))
At any point during the derivation, a newly inferred predicate will take the lower of two
modes from the internal rule or derivation chain. For example, the certainty mode for I4b1
is c, joined with the l mode in int(exchangeCtlMessage(172.16.9.20, 172.16.9.1), l), we get
l as the mode for the resulting fact int(compromised(172.16.9.20), l).
One could argue that the certainty of the derived fact should be lower than that of the
weakest fact in the derivation chain, especially when the derivation chain is long. However,
given the observation that most enterprise network intrusions are carried out in just a few
steps, we do not expect the derivation chains to be long in practice. Since the certainty modes
only represent a rough guess, accounting for certainty level decay along short derivation
paths is unlikely to be significantly valuable.
4.3 Proof strengthening
In the previous section, we discussed the rules used to derive internal conditions. All the
derived internal conditions will have a mode equal or lower than the mode of the observation.
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We use the proof strengthening technique to elevate the confidence level by combining
multiple observations inferring the same internal condition. This step results in creating
high-confidence proof traces which is later presented to a system administrator for further
analysis.
The key purpose of reasoning about uncertainty is to derive high-confidence facts from
low-confidence ones. In the true-life incident, the system administrator strengthened his
belief that the Trend Micro server was compromised by combining three different pieces
of evidence: netflow filter result showing communication with a blacklisted IP address,
memory dump result showing likely malicious code modules, and memory dump result
showing open IRC sockets with other Trend Micro servers. These three pieces of evidence
are independent — they are rooted on observations at different aspects of the system, and
yet they are logically connected — all of them indicate that the Trend Micro server is likely
compromised. Thus, they altogether can strengthen our belief in the fact that the server is
compromised.
We generalize this reasoning process in the following proof strengthening rule.
int(F,m1)⇐ Pf1 int(F,m2)⇐ Pf2 Pf1 ‖ Pf2
int(F, strengthen(m1,m2))⇐ strengthenedPf (Pf1,Pf2)
The ‖ relation indicates that two proofs are independent, meaning they are based on disjoint
sets of observations and internal conditions. This deduction rule states that if we have
two reasoning paths to a fact with some confidence levels and if the two paths are based
on independent observations and deductions, then the confidence level of the fact can be
strengthened.
According to the deduction rule, two independent proofs, Pf1 and Pf2 leading to a inter-
nal fact F, with modes m1 and m2 respectively can be strengthened and a new strengthened
predicate with an elevated mode is created. Mode elevation using strengthen function is
defined below.
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strengthen(l, l) = strengthen(l, p) = strengthen(p, l) = c
In simple words, two independent proofs can strengthen to “certain” if at least one of
them can yield a “likely” mode. There is no definition for strengthen when both parameters
are p or at least one of them is c. Since the p mode represents very low confidence we do
not allow strengthening from just possible facts. There is no need to strengthen a fact if it
has already reached the “certain” level.
We emphasize that the strengthening rules are defined here through our empirical study
on real-life security incidents and these strengthening conditions do reflect the mental process
a human system administrator goes through when catching real attacks.
4.4 Implementation
We use the XSB [49] system to evaluate the Prolog reasoning engine. We also implemented
a simple proof-generator so that whenever a fact is derived, the proof trace for that fact can
also be obtained simultaneously. We applied the reasoning system and the model described
in 3.2 and 3.3 on the input for our case study. The result is shown in Figure 4.2 (IP
addresses are sanitized.). The user enters the query show trace(int(compromised(H),c)),
to find all the provable facts in the form of compromised(H) with “certain” mode. This is
essentially asking the question “which machines are certainly compromised”. The reasoning
engine prints out a derivation trace for 172.16.9.20, the IP address for the compromised
Trend Micro server first identified by the system administrator. It is clear that the derivation
trace exactly matches the reasoning process the human system administrator used to identify
the compromised server — the confidence level is strengthened from concordant evidence
emanated from netflow dump and memory dump.
The execution time of the reasoning system is affected by both the internal model and the
number of input observations. We expect the internal model developed by a user commu-
nity contains a constant (and relatively small) number of internal predicates and assertions
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| ?- show_trace(int(compromised(H),c)).
int(compromised(’172.16.9.20’),c) strengthen
int(compromised(’172.16.9.20’),l) I_4b1
int(exchangeCtlMessage(’172.16.9.20’, ’172.16.9.1’),l) A_5
obs(memoryDumpIRCSocket(’172.16.9.20’, ’172.16.9.1’))
int(compromised(’172.16.9.20’),l) A_4
obs(memoryDumpMaliciousCode(’172.16.9.20’))
int(compromised(’172.16.9.20’),l) A_3
obs(netflowBlackListFilter(’172.16.9.20’, ’129.7.10.5’))
Figure 4.2: Result of applying the reasoning system on the case study
that capture the semantics of security conditions of interest. The simple reasoning rules
described in Section 4.2 can be viewed as evaluating a fixed Datalog program against input
tuples (observations) in XSB whose complexity is dominated by the maximum number of
instantiations of subgoals [38]. Since our model can infer at most as many internal condi-
tions as there are input observations (in an asymptotic sense), the complexity of applying
the simple reasoning rules will be linear in the number of input tuples. The proof strength-
ening rule described in Section 4.3 needs to conduct pair-wise comparison among derivation
paths leading to a fact and hence can have quadratic complexity. Consequently, a rough
estimate of the reasoning time complexity is quadratic in the number of input tuples. This
was empirically verified by our experiments described in chapter 6.
During the evaluation of this empirical model, we recognized a need for pre-processing
and using time information in the reasoning process. The data given as input to the rea-
soning system contains a lot of redundant information which some times overwhelms the
system, in the pre-processing step we reduce the redundancy in the input data. We use the
time information as we have both forward and backward reasoning and they differ in the
time relationship in the derived facts. We discuss the pre-processing and time handling in
the following sections.
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int(probe(ext1, webServer), c, T1)
int(probe(ext2, webServer), c, T2)
...
...
int(probe(extn, webServer), c, Tn)
 int(probe(external, webServer), c, range(T1, Tn))
Figure 4.3: Preprocessing: Summarization
4.5 Pre-processing
The pre-processing step is performed to compact the information entering the reasoning
engine. We apply a data abstraction technique by grouping a set of similar “internal condi-
tions” into a single “summarized internal condition”.
The current implementation of summarization is done on time stamp and IP addresses.
This step is done after the observations are mapped to their internal conditions. If a set
of internal conditions differ only by timestamp, we merge them into a single summarized
internal condition with a time range between the earliest and latest timestamp in the set.
Similarly, we also abstract over external IP addresses so that alerts that differ only on the
external source or destination addresses are merged and the corresponding IP address is
abstracted as “external”. Figure 4.3 depicts the process of summarization with an example.
In this example, multiple observations map to the internal condition, probe with identical
mode, c. These observations have webServer as the destination IP address and a source IP
address from an external network. They may have the same time stamp or temporally close.
When we apply the summarization technique, this yields a single predicate having a wild
card variable external to represent source IP address belonging to external network and a
time range having the earliest and latest time in observations.
In the current implementation, we do not summarize on internal IP addresses as this
knowledge may be useful in the reasoning process. A mapping between the summarized
internal condition and the raw internal conditions/observations identifies the low level facts
belonging to the summarized predicates. The summarized tuples are then passed on to the
reasoning engine.
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4.6 Handling time
Timestamps associated with security monitoring events are important in tracking and di-
agnosing root causes of problems. When an observation correspondence rule is used, the
internal condition on the right hand side simply inherits the time field of the observation
on the left. When an internal model is used, the time stamps associated with the derived
assertion will be derived from the timestamp on the left hand side and the direction of the
rule in a straight-forward manner (e.g., for a forward rule the right hand-side shall happen
after the left hand side). Latency in detection and clock skews can also make timestamps
imprecise and less useful, which needs to be addressed through techniques such as time
windows.
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Chapter 5
Automating model building for Snort
In chapters 3 and 4 we empirically developed a model and reasoning engine for intrusion
analysis based on the true-life incident described in 1.1.1. To test the model developed from
the case study on a publicly available IDS, Snort, we created an Snort add-on, called SnIPS.
The purpose of this tool is to help the users to reason about Snort alerts using the techniques
discussed in the earlier chapters. Figure 5.1 shows the system architecture of SnIPS. It
consist of the reasoning engine and internal model developed from our empirical study,
observation correspondence for Snort alerts created automatically from Snort rule repository
and tools for translating Snort alerts. In this chapter we briefly introduce Snort IDS and
describe our approach to automatically creating a observation correspondence knowledge
base for Snort IDS.
5.1 Snort
Snort [50, 51] is an open source, rule-based network intrusion detection system and is
widely used for real time network traffic analysis. It combines signature, protocol and
anomaly-based inspection for identifying malicious events. Snort is cosmetically similar to
tcpdump [52] but is more focused on the security applications of packet sniffing. The major
feature of Snort is packet payload inspection. Snort decodes the application layer of the
packet and can be given rules to collect traffic that has specific data contained within its
application layer. This allows Snort to detect many types of hostile activity, including buffer
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Figure 5.1: SnIPS system architecture
overflows, CGI scans, or any other data in the packet payload that can be characterized in
a unique detection fingerprint.
5.1.1 Snort architecture
Internally, Snort is made up of a packet sniffer, preprocessor, detection engine and logging
module.
Packet sniffer The packet sniffer module uses libpcap [52] library for reading the network
packets. Typically, Snort listens to a network interface in promiscuous mode. This allows
Snort to read all the packets in the network. The packet sniffer module sends the captured
packet to the preprocessor module.
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alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET any -> $SMTP SERVERS 25 (msg:"EXPLOIT x86 windows
MailMax overflow"; flow:to server,established; content:"|EB|E|EB| [|FC|3|C9
B1 82 8B F3 80|+"; reference:bugtraq,2312; reference:cve,1999-0404;
classtype:attempted-admin; sid:310; rev:8;)
Figure 5.2: An example Snort rule
Preprocessor Snort’s preprocessor is used to either examine packets for suspicious activ-
ity or modify packets so that the detection engine can properly interpret them. For example,
the frag3 preprocessor defeats the IP fragmentation attacks by reassembling fragmented
packets and ARPspoof is a preprocessor designed to detect malicious Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) traffic. There are many pre-processor plugins available in Snort that can
be added by system administrators.
Detection engine The detection engine is the most important feature of Snort. It receives
data from the preprocessor and checks it with a rule set, which contains signatures written
by experts for identifying malicious patterns. If a rule is matched, based on the configuration
of the rule, the packet can be sent to the logging model, dropped or passed.
Alert/Logging module The logging module receives the alert and the associated rule
that triggered the alert. It then writes the alert and rule information to a log file or a
database. Snort logging module can be configured to log the alerts into a log file, database,
windows event viewer, network connection, etc. In most production systems, where the
number of alerts generated can be huge, Snort is configured to store the alerts in a database.
This makes it convenient to manage the large volume and the ability to query for specific
alerts. (Refer to appendix A.3 for schema of the Snort alert database).
5.1.2 Snort signature
A Snort signature consists of a header and rule options. The header section is made up of
action (alert, drop, pass or log packet), protocol (IP, ICMP, TCP), source and destination
IP address (individual IP, range of IPs, list of IPs, or “any”), port (individual port, range of
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ports or “any”) and the direction of the packet. The rule options section contains options
for matching the payload, state of the connection and meta information about the rule.
Figure 5.2 shows an example snort rule for identifying “MailMax overflow exploit” on x86
windows machines. This rule instructs Snort detection engine to issue on alert when both the
header and options are matched. The header information is used by the detection engine as
a filter. When the header criteria is met, the detection engine will compare the rule options
against the packet. In our example, the rule header action is to alert on a tcp packet having
source IP address matching $EXTERNAL NET (A variable set in Snort configuration file) and
any source port. The destination IP address should match $SMTP SERVERS and destination
port number should be 25 (SMTP). All packets matching this criteria will then be compared
with the rule options, and an alert is issued if both criteria are met. Let us look at the
options specified in the rule. The msg specifies a title for the rule and flow option specifies
type of tcp connection. The content keyword is widely used in Snort rule. It is used for
matching a specific pattern in the packet payload. The option flow allows the rule to be
applied to only certain direction of the traffic flow. The rest of the rule options gives meta
information about the rule. sid is for uniquely identifying the rule and rev gives the number
of revisions made to the rule. The reference field points to the informations on the web
and popular vulnerability data such as bugtraq, cve, nessus, arachNIDS and McAfee. The
keyword classtype is a simple classification used by Snort to group rules based on the kind
of attack.
5.1.3 Snort alert
A Snort alert provides information to a system administrator about a potentially malicious
event. It contains source and destination IP address, type of attack, rule details, and other
packet details to help in intrusion analysis. A Snort alert is created when a packet matches
one of the Snort rules and it is stored in a log file or a database based on the configuration.
Figure 5.3 shows a Snort alert stored in a log file (The number is added manually for ease
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(1) [**] [1:2080:8] RPC portmap nlockmgr request TCP [**]
(2) [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
(3) 07/08-10:33:07.074650 129.130.10.171:43191 -> 129.130.10.33:111
(4) TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:40304 IpLen:20 DgmLen:204 DF
(5) ***AP*** Seq: 0xF6970FCF Ack: 0x976A7839 Win: 0x2E TcpLen: 32
(6) TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 161714848 318558254
(7) [Xref => http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=10220]
(8) [Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2000-0508]
(9) [Xref => http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1372]
Figure 5.3: An example Snort alert
of explanation). This alert is issued for an RPC portmap exploit. Line 1 contains the Snort
rule ID and title of the alert. Line 2 contains classtype of the rule that created the alert
and its priority level. Line 3 has packet information such as time stamp, source/destination
IP address and port number. Lines 4-6 contain TCP packet information and lines 7-9 have
web address pointing to resources having the vulnerability information.
5.2 Knowledge base creation
To use Snort alerts for reasoning in the system developed from our empirical study, we need
the observation correspondence relation for mapping Snort alerts to internal conditions. We
automated the knowledge base creation process, since the current Snort system does not
come with such mapping and creating the relation manually for approximately 9000 Snort
rules1 is tedious.
From our analysis, we found Snort rules and associated signature documents contained
valuable meta information useful for determining the observation correspondence relation.
We created a parser to extract the required information from these documents and using this
information, we automatically created the observation correspondence relation for a large
portion of the Snort rule. We discuss the meta information considered in our automated
process below.
1In Snort rule set version 2.8
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Snort Classtype Internal Condition Mode
attempted admin
compromised
l
attempted user l
successful admin c
successful user c
trojan activity l
shellcode detect
sendExploit
l
unsuccessful user p
web application attack l
web application activity p
attempted recon
probeOtherMachine
l
successful recon largescale c
successful recon limited c
network scan p
rpc portmap decode l
icmp event p
suspicious filename detect
Unknown Unknown
suspicious login
system call detect
unusual client port connection
misc activity
not suspicious
protocol command decode
string detect
unknown
tcp connection
policy violation
kickass porn
attempted dos
bad unknown
default login attempt
denial of service
misc attack
non standard protocol
successful dos
Table 5.1: Automatically created obsMap
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5.2.1 Classtype
The classtype keyword in a Snort rule is used for categorizing the rules into a more gen-
eral attack class. For example, Snort rule 1:3156 (ORACLE XDB FTP UNLOCK overflow
attempt), can possibly give the attacker administrator privileges on a victim machine. Thus,
this rule comes under the class type attempted-admin. Snort currently has 30 default class
types for a rule writer to classify the nature of the potential security implication. Some of
these class types roughly correspond to the internal predicates developed during our empir-
ical study. So, we manually created a mapping between class type and internal predicates
as given in table 5.1. Using this table, we infer the observation correspondence for the rule
in figure 5.2 as shown below:
obsMap(obsRuleId_3614,
obs(snort(’1:310’, FromHost, ToHost)),
int(compromised(FromHost, ToHost)), l).
Some of the class types is mapped to unknown as the class type information was insuffi-
cient for us to determine a relation. For such cases, we try to use the information available
in the rule document to find the answer.
5.2.2 Snort rule document
For some cases the class type alone does not provide enough information for determining
the observation correspondence relation, so we make use of the information available in the
Snort rule documents.
Each Snort rule has a document which provides a brief description in the following
sections: summary, impact, affected systems, ease of attack, false positives, false negatives,
corrective actions, contributions and additional reference (Appendix A.2 has an example
Snort rule document). The information found under “Impact” and “Ease of Attack” in
particular are quite useful for inferring the internal predicates. For example, the Snort rule
1:1140 is
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alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS
(msg:"WEB-MISC guestbook.pl access"; flow:to_server,established;
uricontent: "/guestbook.pl"; nocase; metadata:service http;
classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1140; rev:12;)
The natural language description of the two fields ”Impact” and ”Ease of attack” for
the above rule is:
Impact:
Information gathering and system integrity compromise. Possible
unauthorized administrative access to the server. Possible
execution of arbitrary code of the attackers choosing in some cases.
Ease of Attack: Simple. Exploits exist.
Using the keywords “possible administrative access” and “possible execution of arbitrary
code” in the “Impact” section and keyword “exploits exist” in the “Ease of Attack” field,
our automated program infers the following observation correspondence predicate:
obsMap(obsRuleId_3615,
obs(snort(’1:1140’, FromHost, ToHost)),
int(compromised(ToHost)), p).
In general, we found that these two fields are often composed of a set of fixed keywords.
Examples are “possible unauthorized administrative access”, “possible execution of arbitrary
code”, “exploits exist”, and so on. These phrases often indicate what internal predicate and
certainty mode can be assigned to the alert. Our automated program searches for those
keywords in the Snort rule document. Based on the combination of keywords contained in
a Snort rule description, a simple heuristic algorithm infers the internal condition and the
certainty mode for alerts generated by the Snort rule.
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obs(100, snort(’1:1140’, ’75.149.65.202’, ’64.40.147.175’, 1254954059)).
obs(101, snort(’1:1140’, ’75.149.65.202’, ’64.40.147.175’, 1254954059)).
obs(102, snort(’1:998’, ’10.23.3.10’, ’64.40.147.180’, 1254954060)).
Figure 5.4: Example translated Snort alerts
Using this approach, we were able to automatically generate the observation correspon-
dence relations for 60% of the 9000 Snort rules. This is a rough baseline, since the tool
has to make an “educated guess” from imprecise and incomplete information. But such an
initial model, derived from the knowledge already existent in the Snort rule repository, is
helpful for Snort users to get started benefiting from our empirically developed technique.
If our reasoning system turns to be useful tool by a significant number of users, there will
be incentives for more people to help fine-tune observation correspondence, and even for
future Snort rules to include such information. Security expert who writes a Snort rule (or
any such specification) has the best knowledge on what the observation means and is best
suited to provide this information. This will not incur additional burden since much of this
information is already being maintained in an unformatted and ad-hoc manner.
5.3 Snort alert translation
Snort provides different plugins to store the output alerts. We store the alerts in a MySQL
database. The tool provides a facility to query the mysql database and translate the Snort
alerts stored as Datalog tuples, a format understood by the reasoning engine.
Snort alerts are represented as observations, obs. The format of obs is shown below.
obs(ObsID, snort(SnortID, FromHost, ToHost, TimeStamp)).
Each predicate has an observation ID, Snort ID, from and to host IP address along with
the timestamp. ObsID is a unique value to identify a snort alert/observation. SnortID, a
combination of Generator ID2 and Snort Rule ID is used to identify the system responsible
for raising the alert. FromHost and ToHost IP address gives the source and destination IP
2Generator ID identifies internal subsystem that raised the alert.
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address of the packet that matched the rule. Timestamp gives us the time when the alert
was raised by Snort. Figure 5.4 has some example of translated Snort alerts.
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Chapter 6
Experiments
IDS evaluation is elusive because of the unavailability of data and lack of information for
verifying the results. Data sets created from production network (real attacks) lack necessary
information (ground truths) to verify success of an attack. And data sets created in a
controlled setup have ground truths but in most cases do not depict the actual scenarios [53,
54]. In our evaluation our primary goal was to test weather a reasoning model developed
empirically from studying one incident can find interesting attack traces in others. We
evaluated our reasoning engine on data sets collected using different techniques. Of the
three data sets we used, one was collected from a live exercise conducted as part of the
graduate course in computer security. The second data set was from a honey pot, and
the last data set was from a live production network. Our results clearly indicate that the
reasoning engine is capable of identifying interesting traces on the data sets.
6.1 Experimental setup
We used the SnIPS tool for our experiments. First, alerts generated from running Snort
on a live network or a tcpdump is sent to a MySQL database for storage. The stored
alerts are then translated into observations in Datalog format and stored in a text file. The
reasoning engine, internal model, observation correspondence and observations were loaded
into a XSB prolog engine. Then the engine is issued with queries like “Is the webServer
certainly compromised?” or “Is any host certainly compromised?”. The reasoning system
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Figure 6.1: Treasure hunt network topology
provides the results in the form of strengthened proof and evidences, which is then provided
to a system administrator for further evaluation.
6.2 Data sets
6.2.1 Treasure Hunt data set
The first set of experiments was performed on the Treasure Hunt (TH) data set [55]. This
data set was created during a cyber-attack competition organized in a graduate security
course at University of California, Santa Barbara. Our motivation to use this particular data
set was that the data set provides valuable “meta data” such as the back story (competition
task details) and network topology which can help us understand the result. We only used
the TCPdump portion of the dataset to generate Snort alerts as input to the reasoning
engine.
Two teams, Alpha and Omega, were participating in the exercise. In order to prevent the
two teams from interfering with each other, two identical networks were setup. The topology
of the network used in the exercise is show in figure 6.11. The web server (WWW 1 & 2)
was located in a DMZ accessible from the Internet. The MySQL server (SAA/SOO), the
1Figure source http://ictf.cs.ucsb.edu/data/treasurehunt2002/
44
(1) int(compromised(’192.168.10.90’),c) strengthen
(2) int(compromised(’192.168.10.90’),p) I_3f
(3) int(sendExploit(external,’192.168.10.90’), p) summarizedFact
obslist(273)
(4) int(compromised(’192.168.10.90’),l) I_1b
(5) int(probeOtherMachine(’192.168.10.90’, ’128.111.48.35’), l) summarizedFact
obslist(257)
Figure 6.2: Partial output trace from the reasoning system
file server (UAA/UOO), and the transaction server (TAA/TOO) were placed on a separate
network, accessible only by the web server host (Servers with suffix AA belong to the Alpha
team and suffix OO belong to Omega).
We discuss one of the proofs created by the reasoning engine. The first task in the TH
competition was to gain access to the web server. This scenario was identified by our model
and the high-confident output is shown in figure 6.2 (the parenthesized numbers are added
for explanation purpose). The web server, 192.168.10.90, was certainly compromised (1)
based on two independent proofs: (2) and (4), which capture the first step: an exploit being
sent from an external host to the web server (3), and the second step: reconnaissance by
the attacker from the web server to learn about the internal network (5). The two pieces of
evidence both point to the compromise of the web server, strengthening our confidence level
to “certain”. The raw alerts belonging to the summarized internal condition is identified
using the mapping variable obslist(Var). In total, there were 18 such proofs verifying the
two web servers were compromised. Table 6.1 shows the reduction in the amount of data
that was presented by our tool to the system administrator for further analysis.
We manually validated the raw alerts of the 18 proofs generated by the reasoning engine
for false positives. From our analysis we perceive all of them are plausible. The published
TH data set did not include a truth file (a file containing information on how the actual
attacks were carried out and to what extent they were successful). Thus it was impossible
to identify if the reasoning engine missed any true attack traces (false negatives).
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6.2.2 Experiment on data collected on a honeypot
We conducted our second set of experiments on a data set collected from a honeypot deployed
at Purdue University. This data set contains network traffic information collected for an
unrelated project whose main intention was to collect spam relayed using open proxies.
The network setup of the honeypot was simple, it had a single host running misconfigured
squid proxy server. The data was collected few hours every day for a period of two months.
The total size of the zipped tcpdump files was about 68GB. When we applied Snort on the
tcpdump, it reported 637,564 alerts from the network traffic. Our analysis on the Snort alert
showed that 99% of the alerts were Snort alert ’122:27’ (portscan:port open). We filtered
this particular alert from the input as it did not provide valuable information about host
compromise.
The reasoning engine had enough information to conclude the honeypot host was com-
promised. With the knowledge about operating system and services running in the honeypot
host, we validated the traces manually.
6.2.3 Experiments on a production system
The last two experiments also helped us find a few inaccuracies in the observation correspon-
dence relations created by the automated model building process, which were subsequently
corrected. In the last experiment, SnIPS with the updated knowledge base was applied
on an university network. We installed Snort in our departmental network having around
200 machines including workstation, dedicated web servers, file servers, database servers
etc. We were only able to analyze the alerts captured over a period of three days. Snort
reported about 1.1 Million alerts with 150 different alert types and 15 class types. Table 6.1
shows the number of alerts generated by Snort and the number of high-confidence proofs
presented to a system administrator. The 17 proofs pointed that 4 hosts had a higher chance
of being compromised. To verify this result would require further analysis of other log data
which we did not have access to. We analyzed the output traces with the corresponding
46
Data set Snort alerts Summarized alerts High-confidence proofs
Treasure Hunt 4,849,937 278 18
Honeypot 637,564 30 8
Production system 1,138,572 6634 17
Table 6.1: Reduction of alert
low-level alerts. It appeared that a couple traces were worthy of further investigation and
we forwarded those to the system administrator. The others were likely to be false positives.
6.3 Results
From our experiments with the available data sets, we observed that the tool we devel-
oped based on true-life incident was able to identify interesting traces of host compromise
from low-level Snort alerts and considerably reduced the search space and time involved in
identifying intrusion from Snort alerts.
Our current implementation of the reasoning engine only used Snort alerts as input.
Since Snort alerts provided a limited view of an intrusion, some of the proof strengthening
appeared to be false positives. These experiments helped us to identify potential information
and techniques to improve the quality of the reasoning engine. We discuss some of the ideas
in chapter 7.
6.4 Observations from the data sets
From our analysis on the data sets, we noticed that a small number of alerts occur in huge
numbers in these data set. For example, we can see in the figure 6.3 that in Treasure Hunt
data set more than 99% of the total alerts fall under two attack classes “web-application-
activity” and “web-application-attack” each having only one type of alert. This could be
cased by repeated attempts made by the attacker to make the exploit work by trying different
parameters. We also noticed that the traffic from the live network and data collected
honeypot had similar characteristics. Huge volume of some alerts were created because
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Figure 6.3: Data distribution in the three data sets
of noisy rules or repeated probes by Botnet. By using data sets collected from different
environment, we were able to test our tool for many diverse cases and scenarios.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we presented an empirical approach to modeling uncertainty in intrusion
analysis. Our goal is to help the system administrator in reaching conclusions quickly about
possible intrusions, when multiple pieces of uncertain data have to be integrated. The model
language we designed has two components: observation correspondence and internal model.
The observation correspondence gives a direct meaning to low-level system monitoring data
with explicit uncertainty tags, and can be derived from natural-language description that
already exists in some IDS knowledge bases, e.g. the Snort rule repository. The internal
model is concise and captures general multi-stage attack conditions in an enterprise network.
We developed a reasoning system that is easy to understand, handles the uncertainty existent
in both observation correspondence and the internal model, and finds high-confidence attack
traces from many possible interpretations of the low-level monitoring data. Our prototype
and experiments show that the model developed from studying one set of data is effective for
analyzing completely different data sets with very little effort. This is a strong indication
that the modeling approach can codify the seemingly ad-hoc reasoning process found in
intrusion analysis and yield practical tools for enterprise-network security defense.
7.1 Future work
From our empirical study we found new research problems and identified areas that need to
be improved in our current implementation. We discuss the ideas in this section and leave
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them for future work.
In our current proof strengthening approach, we consider two independent proof paths for
proof strengthening. This approach provided a simple mechanism for elevating our beliefs.
A graphical representation of the model will provide a greater flexibility for capturing the
semantics of the proofs and elevating confidence levels.
Our current implementation uses only the host information for summarization. Having
more information about the host, network topology and vulnerability information will help
in preventing false strengthening and the alert verification technique discussed in related
work can be used to improve the quality of input alerts.
As this is the first time that uncertainty has been dealt with in this explicit but qualitative
manner, much work remains to be done, some of which we have already alluded to earlier.
Specifically, our modality is a very crude operator – we do not distinguish the various forms
of uncertainty. On a practical level adding too much complexity to the modality itself may
be counter-productive. But with some maturity of modeling and experience, we hope to
separate in our model these two sources of uncertainty as well. As in any modeling tool,
there is a natural question of how granular our models have to be to achieve best results.
Because the uncertainty of knowledge increases after a certain granularity, we expect that
there is an optimal point that can only be discovered with experience. Our modeling and
reasoning are monotonic and we do not deal with negation in our models. Although we have
not needed it in the data we analyzed, it is plausible that a new observation can reduce the
modality of an internal condition, e.g. from likely to possible. These are some areas subject
to future research.
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Appendix A
Snort – Intrusion detection system
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A.1 Snort default classtype
Classtype Description Priority
attempted-admin Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain high
attempted-user Attempted User Privilege Gain high
kickass-porn SCORE! Get the lotion! high
policy-violation Potential Corporate Privacy Violation high
shellcode-detect Executable code was detected high
successful-admin Successful Administrator Privilege Gain high
successful-user Successful User Privilege Gain high
trojan-activity A Network Trojan was detected high
unsuccessful-user Unsuccessful User Privilege Gain high
web-application-attack Web Application Attack high
attempted-dos Attempted Denial of Service medium
attempted-recon Attempted Information Leak medium
bad-unknown Potentially Bad Traffic medium
default-login-attempt Attempt to login by a default username and
password
medium
denial-of-service Detection of a Denial of Service Attack medium
misc-attack Misc Attack medium
non-standard-protocol Detection of a non-standard protocol or event medium
rpc-portmap-decode Decode of an RPC Query medium
successful-dos Denial of Service medium
successful-recon-largescale Large Scale Information Leak medium
successful-recon-limited Information Leak medium
suspicious-filename-detect A suspicious filename was detected medium
suspicious-login An attempted login using a suspicious user-
name was detected
medium
system-call-detect A system call was detected medium
unusual-client-port-connection A client was using an unusual port medium
web-application-activity Access to a potentially vulnerable web appli-
cation
medium
icmp-event Generic ICMP event low
misc-activity Misc activity low
network-scan Detection of a Network Scan low
not-suspicious Not Suspicious Traffic low
protocol-command-decode Generic Protocol Command Decode low
string-detect A suspicious string was detected low
unknown Unknown Traffic low
tcp-connection A TCP connection was detected very low
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A.2 An example Snort rule document
A Snort rule document is a plain text file which contains a detailed information about a
Snort rule. This document is typically created by the rule writer. The following is an
example Snort rule document taken from “4333.txt”:
Rule:
--
Sid:
4333
--
Summary:
This event is generated when an attempt is made to exploit a known
vulnerability is the Microsoft Plug and Play subsystem on a host.
--
Impact:
Serious. Execution of code is possible leading to full system
compromise.
--
Detailed Information:
A programming error in the Plug and Play (PnP) service used by
Microsoft Windows machines can present a remote attacker with the
opportunity to overflow a fixed length buffer, execute code on the
vulnerable system and escalate privileges on the host to the extent
that they could take complete control of the affected machine.
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Specifically this event is generated when the UMPNGMGR interface is
targeted via the function.
--
Affected Systems:
Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
Microsoft Windows 2003
--
Attack Scenarios:
An attacker merely needs to send extra data to the PnP service to
overflow the buffer and execute code of their choosing on the affected
system.
--
Ease of Attack:
Simple.
--
False Positives:
None known.
--
False Negatives:
None known.
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--
Corrective Action:
Apply the appropriate vendor supplied patches.
Disallow access to ports 139 and 445 from sources external to the
protected network.
Consider disabling the use of those ports completely on Windows based
networks.
--
Contributors:
Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team
Matt Watchinski <matthew.watchinski@sourcefire.com>
Nigel Houghton <nigel.houghton@sourcefire.com>
--
Additional References:
--
A.3 Snort database schema
Snort database schema taken from [51] gives the structure of the Snort alerts stored in
MySQL database. We briefly describe the table structure here.
The schema is designed to store alerts reported by more than one sensor and the ta-
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ble “sensor” contains information about each sensor. The “sid” field in this table helps
uniquely identify a sensor. And each event reported by a sensor has an entry in the “event”
table, which is uniquely identified by the key pair “cid” and “sid”. The event table also
contains a field to identify signature of an event and timestamp. The “signature” table
contains the meta information about events such as the class type, priority, Snort rule id
and Snort rule revision. Using tables “sig reference”, “reference” and “reference system”
we can find reference to various vulnerability resources. The table “iphdr” holds the source
and destination IP address and other flags set in the packet that matched a rule. Tables
“icmphdr”, “tcphdr” and “udphdr” contains the header information of icmp, tcp and udp
packets respectively.
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sig_reference
PK,FK2 sig_id
PK,FK1 ref_id
ref_seq
protocols
protocol
name
description
icmphdr
PK,FK1 cid
PK,FK1 sid
icmp_type
icmp_code
icmp_csum
icmp_id
icmp_seq
signature
PK sig_id
sig_name
FK1 sig_class_id
sig_priority
sig_rev
sig_sid
reference
PK ref_id
FK1 ref_system_id
ref_tag
reference_system
PK ref_system_id
ref_system_name
iphdr
PK,FK1 cid
PK,FK1 sid
ip_src
ip_dst
ip_ver
ip_hlen
ip_tos
ip_len
ip_id
ip_flags
ip_off
ip_ttl
FK2 ip_proto
ip_csum
tcphdr
PK,FK2 cid
PK,FK2 sid
FK3 tcp_sport
FK4 tcp_dport
tcp_seq
tcp_ack
tcp_off
tcp_res
FK1 tcp_flags
tcp_win
tcp_csum
tcp_urp
detail
PK detail_type
detail_text
schema
PK vseq
ctime
encoding
PK encoding_type
encoding_text
sensor
PK sid
hostname
interface
filter
FK2 detail
FK1 encoding
last_cid
event
PK,FK2 sid
PK cid
FK1 signature
timestamp
flags
number
RES1
RES2
URG
ACK
PSH
RST
SYN
FIN
valid
description
udphdr
PK,FK1 cid
PK,FK1 sid
FK2 udp_sport
FK3 udp_dport
udp_len
udp_csum
services
port
protocol
name
description
sig_class
PK sig_class_id
sig_class_name
opt
PK,FK1 cid
PK,FK1 sid
PK optid
opt_proto
opt_code
opt_len
opt_data
Snort Database Schema v1.06
Diagram created Sept 10, 2004
chris.reid@codecraftconsultants.com
data
PK,FK1 cid
PK,FK1 sid
data_payload
Standard Snort Table
SnortDB Extra Table
Bold fields are “not null”
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